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Abstract:  
Genocide education would benefit from a renewed focus on how ordinary people 
perpetuate atrocities more so than villains. Ordinary evil is often understood via Hannah 
Arendt’s political theory, which explains how people can contribute thoughtlessly to 
genocide. This “banality of evil” explains an important aspect of human behavior, 
especially when understood in conjunction with Elizabeth Minnich’s work on intensive 
and extensive evil, as well as with Stanley Milgram’s research on obedience. Yet Arendt, 
Minnich, and Milgram do not explain ordinary people who become eager killers. Thus, the 
addition of Ernest Becker’s idea of the fetishization of evil is important. Students would 
benefit from engaging with Arendt and Becker’s theories in tandem, as well as from 
learning about disobedience and ways to expand fetishized perceptions of others 
Key words: Hannah Arendt, Ernest Becker, genocide, social studies, terror management 
theory 
Introduction 
How might we teach about genocide with a view toward a less violent future? A common 
rationale for engaging with the topic of genocide, particularly the Holocaust, is that students will 
then work to prevent future genocides (Marks, 2017). We have cried out “Never again!” over and 
over, however, and atrocities continue to happen while teachers seek ways to teach about these 
horrors. This essay offers one way for educators to open up thinking about human-driven 
atrocities by shifting the focus from singular villains or mindless drones to the processes that 
shape ordinary folks like ourselves into killers. 
This focus entails pairing Hannah Arendt’s sense of the banality of evil with insights from cultural 
anthropologist Ernest Becker, particularly his observations about the human capacity to fetishize 
evil. Becker’s theoretical work has morphed into terror management theory (TMT; Solomon, 
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2015), an area of experimental social psychology with hundreds of 
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studies in multiple cultural contexts (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, & Maxfield, 2006). 
Through Becker and TMT, we can understand how ordinary people perpetuate evil intentionally. 
By combining the ideas of Arendt and Becker, educators can focus on how we are all capable not 
only of thoughtlessly contributing to atrocities but also of killing others out of heroic joy. 
Although this framing is somewhat gloomy, it might give both teachers and students hope for 
understanding and thus preventing further violence. 
Hannah Arendt, Stanley Milgram, and the Banality of Evil 
Arendt has given us much insight into a process of evil. Specifically, evil intent is not required to 
do an evil deed. What, then, begins the process of evil? For Arendt (1963/2006), this evil is a form 
of thoughtlessness—the “banality of evil.” As Arendt (1977) stated more than a decade after her 
initial exploration of mundane evil, “The sad truth of the matter is that most evil is done by people 
who never made up their minds to be or to do either evil or good” (p. 180). 
In some contexts, this situation is interpreted as our socialization to follow orders, as in Stanley 
Milgram’s (in)famous experiments on destructive obedience. In the early 1960s at Yale, Milgram 
conducted a study in which participants were told to administer increasingly powerful electric 
shocks as a teaching tool on another participant (who was not a participant, but a confederate 
of the experimenter). Also unbeknownst to the participants was that no shocks were actually 
administered. Milgram (1963) sought to understand why people followed orders to harm and kill 
during the Holocaust: 
Gas chambers were built, death camps were guarded, daily quotas of corpses were 
produced with the same efficiency as the manufacture of appliances. These inhumane 
policies may have originated in the mind of a single person, but they could only be carried 
out on a massive scale if a very large number of persons obeyed orders. (p. 371) 
Milgram’s study and further experiments inspired by it have prompted fruitful discussion about 
obedience to authority. Some people act as if they have no choice but to obey (Hamachek, 1976). 
Participants in Milgram’s study who completed the experiment and issued the maximum levels 
of electric shocks seemed to deflect responsibility to the experimenter: “You [the experimenter] 
want me to keep going?” “You accept all responsibility?” “You’re going to keep giving him, what, 
450 volts?” (Matt, 2013). Such sentiments stand in contrast with participants who disobeyed 
orders: “Take the cheque back. I’m not going to hurt the guy!” “Yes, I have a choice!” (Matt, 
2013). Hamachek (1976) noted that “The most disturbing phenomenon is that so many of us 
seem to behave as if we are robbed of free will once a directive is issued from a sufficiently 
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powerful authority source” (p. 444). Those who disobeyed saw that they had a choice, while 
those who obeyed often did so reluctantly but did not take control of their actions. 
In other contexts (and not necessarily mutually exclusively), thoughtlessness can be interpreted 
as a lack of critical thought about how ordinary individuals can affect others (den Heyer & van 
Kessel, 2015; van Kessel & Crowley, 2017). From Arendt we know that ordinary people can 
contribute to great harm simply by going about their business and failing to consider how they 
are part of a harmful system. She illustrated this idea with Adolf Eichmann, who we now know 
was not the best choice for her theory (Stangneth, 2015); however, there are countless others 
who could serve as exemplars of banal evil, such as the members of the reserve police battalion 
that played a central role in carrying out the Final Solution against Jews in Poland (Browning, 
1993). 
Extensive and Intensive Evil 
Elizabeth Minnich, a student of Arendt, refined and expanded upon Arendt’s original formulation. 
Minnich (2014) considered evil to be in two categories: extensive and intensive. Extensive evil is 
a reformulation of Arendt’s “banality of evil”:  
… the massive and monstrous harms carried out by many, many people for significant 
periods of times—months, years, decades, and more (slavery and sexualized violence: 
when has humanity been without these and others?). They are the evils of which we 
would not speak, of which we so often say, “unthinkable.” (Minnich, 2014, p. 170)  
Ordinary and otherwise decent people partake in extensive evil, and the systemic level of the evil 
requires that sustaining it “be conventional to do its work as one’s job, daily, day after day after 
day after day, with supper at home and picnics on the weekends” (p. 170). This situation is what 
concerned Arendt, but there are also those who deliberately inflict massive harm. This type of 
evil is what Minnich (2014) called intensive. 
Intensive evils are perpetuated by a limited number of people who “stand in shuddering contrast 
with the lives others are leading around them in their times [and w]hen they burst into our lives, 
we are genuinely spectators, not participants, not enablers, and not perpetrators” (p. 169). These 
are people like serial killers—individuals who cause intense harm. Are these our villains of 
history? Perhaps some, but certainly not all. Again, like Arendt, Minnich provides a helpful 
framing for thinking about evil, but all evildoers are not counted in her framework. We have 
records that some otherwise ordinary people (i.e., not psychopaths) can delight in killing instead 
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of simply following orders or thoughtlessly contributing to harm. We know, for example, that 
during the Rwandan genocide, despite some participants needing to be coaxed or coerced, 
others became eager killers (Hatzfeld, 2006). 
Ernest Becker: Fetishizing Evil 
Evil as Worldview Threats 
While Arendt revealed how we can perpetuate evil without intending it, Becker (1975) explained 
why sometimes ordinary people can indeed purposely do evil deeds. Firstly, how did Becker 
define evil? Evil is that which threatens our existence (literal or symbolic). All organisms have a 
self-preservation instinct and thus they lash out against any opposing power that threatens 
them. Because humans can anticipate future outcomes and are aware that death is eventually 
coming, we can fear death even in the absence of an immediate threat. To manage that anxiety, 
humans have to devise ways of “transcending the world of flesh and blood, which was a 
perishable one. This [we] did by fixing on a world which is not perishable, by devising an ‘invisible 
project’ that would assure [our] immortality” (Becker, 1975, p. 63). 
We can cultivate a variety of personal immortality projects to leave an enduring imprint on the 
world such as having children, building monuments, or accumulating academic citations, but our 
cultural worldview plays a prominent role. Cultural worldviews are humanly created, shared, 
symbolic conceptions of reality, and serve as a powerful form of protection from impermanence. 
Our ideologies and symbols will live on: “Societies can be seen as structures of immortality 
power” (Becker, 1975, p. 63). Consequently, a threat to our worldview is akin to a threat to our 
very lives (Schimel, Hayes, Williams, & Jahrig, 2007). 
Worldview Threat as Difficult Knowledge 
Alice Pitt and Deborah Britzman (2003) have been examining questions such as “What makes 
knowledge difficult, and what is it to represent and narrate ‘difficult knowledge’?” (p. 755). 
Through the lens of Ernest Becker, a particular form of difficult knowledge could be linked to 
challenges to our worldview. Indeed, the “force of an event is felt before it can be understood” 
(Pitt & Britzman, 2003, p. 758) and there can be “a cascade of responses” (Garrett, 2017, p. 19). 
Because humans are consciously aware of death, we have the intellectual capacity to see evil 
(death) in all that threatens us, which can be anything at any time. It would be impossible to 
function while experiencing constant existential terror, so we develop coping mechanisms. 
Defensive behavior can be somewhat banal, such as decreased reading comprehension of 
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worldview disconfirming information (Williams, Schimel, Hayes, & Faucher, 2012): We can avoid 
difficult knowledge without even knowing it. 
Fetishizing Evil 
Defensive behavior can also be destructive. Those who threaten our worldview are evils that 
must be eradicated. People “use one another to assure their personal victory over death” 
(Becker, 1975, p. 108). Becker talks about fetishizing fear by localizing all of one’s fear and anxiety 
into a single, manageable source. We often scapegoat marginalized groups, but we can fetishize 
any group as the embodiment of evil. We take all that threatens to overwhelm us and confine it 
to a particular group of people, cause, ideology, or, in some cases, a specific person, which is then 
labelled as evil. Our heroic quest, then, is to annihilate it. One’s own group is “pure and good” 
and others “are the real animals, are spoiling everything for you, contaminating your purity and 
bringing disease and weakness into your vitality” (Becker, 1975, p. 93). We have seen this in the 
Nazis conceptualizing Jews as infectious vermin and the Hutus labelling the Tutsis as cockroaches. 
A disturbing TMT study found that a worldview threat is buffered if worldview violators have 
been killed (Hayes, Schimel, & Williams, 2008). 
There are countless examples of this process throughout history: One group demonizes another 
group, often by labeling them as evil. In 1979, the Iranian leader Ruhollah Khomeini called the 
United States “the Great Satan” due to the U.S. government’s imperialistic (and threatening) 
behavior (al-Balaghah, 1969); in the United States in 2002, George W. Bush called Iraq, North 
Korea, and Iran the “Axis of Evil,” which has associated Muslims with evil (Bush, 2002; 
Semmerling, 2008; van Kessel, 2017). Such fetishization is not a thing of the past; for example, 
U.S. president Donald Trump (2017) tweeted, “We must keep ‘evil’ out of our country!” in 
reference to the refugees he sought to suspend from entering the United States (e.g., Syrians) as 
well as the barred visa applications from seven Muslim-majority countries. 
Why do people fetishize evil? It is ultimately a way of dealing with our own sense of vulnerability 
and death. Fetishizing evil is a way of confining our fear to a specific, manageable object. It is a 
way of making our fear concrete and controllable. Then, by coming against the evil, lashing out 
against it and in some cases eradicating it, we assert our own purity, specialness, and our own 
status as heroes. Thus, from Becker’s perspective, many forms of aggression aimed at 
annihilating others with a “lust for killing” is a result of the fetishization of evil. 
 
Journal of International Social Studies, v. 8, n. 2, 2018, pp. 160-171 
 
 
Corresponding author:  vankesse@ualberta.ca  
©2012/2018 National Council for Social Studies International Assembly 




Fetishizing Evil and Shrinking Perspective 
In order to deal with our sense of vulnerability in life and to go on living and expanding, we may 
shrink our perception to fetishize our fears. As we seek to defend our worldview, we narrow our 
focus, and our tolerance and understanding are reduced. This process is destructive because 
when our perception narrows, we become blind to the consequences of our actions. And here is 
a link back to Arendtian thoughtlessness: When we operate with a narrow outlook as heroes 
blindly fighting evil, we fail to think about the harm we are inflicting upon others. Thus, otherwise 
ordinary people seem to have a lust for killing (e.g., genocide) in an attempt to eradicate evil. 
Furthermore, as we attempt to destroy the evil ones, our actions can arouse the same desire in 
them to annihilate us, which leads to an endless cycle of violence. By seeking to eliminate evil, 
we cause it: 
The thing that makes man [sic] the most devastating animal that ever stuck his neck up 
into the sky is that he wants an earth that is not an earth but a heaven, and the price for 
this kind of fantastic ambition is to make the earth an even more eager graveyard than it 
naturally is. (Becker, 1975, p. 96) 
The fetishization of evil and its intensely destructive consequences have repercussions for how 
we might teach about the atrocities of historical and contemporary times. 
Implications for Education 
It is all too easy to name a single villain as the face of systemic harm, and thus let ordinary 
individuals off the hook, so to speak (van Kessel & Crowley, 2017). Instead, we need to arrange 
our curriculum in ways that encourage the study of ordinary people like ourselves. In this paper, 
let us focus on three interrelated strategies: teaching Arendt and Becker in tandem, teaching 
disobedience, and expanding fetishized perceptions. 
Teaching Arendt and Becker 
From Arendt and Becker, we have come to understand how people like ourselves can perpetuate 
extraordinary death and destruction, both intentionally and unintentionally. Teaching both 
thinkers in tandem has powerful explanatory power because it explains both intentional and 
unintentional evil acts done by ordinary folk. It broadens our understanding of evil doers. 
Although Becker has been largely ignored in the field of education, scholars have engaged with 
Arendt’s “banality of evil” in helpful ways. For example, Spector (2017) discussed Maxine 
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Greene’s engagement with the banal evils that threaten public education, particularly 
“technocratic thoughtlessness” (p. 42) and judgments enforced by “general codes or best 
practices” (p. 45), both of which are in opposition to meaningful engagements with imagination. 
In a different context, Lange (2012) discussed the “thoughtlessness” that is part of the banality 
of evil in the context of preventing it through education for action (p. 6), and the Utica City School 
District (1976) in New York issued a curriculum redesign and teacher in-service document, “The 
Nature of Good and Evil,” which engages with Arendt’s concept of the banality of evil directly. As 
part of Project SEARCH for an interdisciplinary humanistic curriculum, the authors of the 
document called for students to define good and evil for themselves and accept responsibility for 
their actions (Utica City School District, 1976). Through literature, film, and other media, Grade 
10 students would develop an understanding of how their own (in)actions impact the world 
around them. The Utica curriculum provided a reading list for teachers, reading/viewing lists for 
students, and classroom activities and assignments. Such excellent work can be updated in terms 
of historical context as well as with a complementary engagement with the work of Becker. 
Future work needs to be done developing specific resources for teachers to present Arendt and 
Becker’s work to students, notably in history, literature, psychology, and social studies. 
Teaching Disobedience 
Blind obedience has been revealed again and again as an incredibly harmful situation. Although 
it is tempting to ascribe obedience to either a personality trait or a particular situation, 
psychological studies show that both are in play (Blass, 1991). Obedience is learned, but the 
process is complex: “different individuals are motivated in different degrees to be more or less 
obedient because of a complex socialization mix of learning to live up to expectations and of 
learning to trust and/or fear authority” (Hamachek, 1976, p. 445). Students need to learn that 
those in power (e.g., governments) are “not always ethical or moral” (Marks, 2017, p. 131) and 
can enact (and have enacted) perfectly legal but horrific deeds. The study of these instances (e.g., 
in Nazi Germany our during the Rwandan genocide) can be paired with discussions of personal 
tendencies toward authoritarian submission, defined as a “submissive, uncritical attitude toward 
idealized moral authorities of the ingroup” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 
1950, p. 228). The hope here is that educators will encourage the sort of critical thinking that is 
independent of authority. As we know from Milgram’s (1965) work, the presence of others who 
show disobedience heightens our capabilities to stand up for what we know is right. 
In terms of curriculum, we need to address the issue of obedience. Some students may assume 
that, for example, Nazi soldiers were simply following orders and, if willing participants, they 
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were merely products of their education and background—there is little room for individual 
responsibility (Lang, 1990). Salzman (2000) has taught a course on the psychology of the 
Holocaust, where personal and social factors are considered regarding those who participated in 
genocide. After beginning with historical context, the class considers “dispositional explanations 
for perpetrator behavior” that include Milgram’s work, as well as psychiatric research on the 
Nuremberg war crimes defendants (Borofsky & Brand, 1980; Zilmer, Harrower, Ritzler, & Archer, 
1995) and Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford’s (1950) work on the authoritarian 
personality, among other works. 
We also need to be careful to avoid unintentionally teaching blind obedience through our daily 
classroom activities. Gordon (1999) discussed the banality of evil in terms of day-to-day 
pedagogy. He calls for educators to avoid indicators of thoughtlessness in their teaching practice 
such as using “clichés and stock phrases” as responses to student input, encouraging students’ 
“blind devotion and admiration” to the teacher, and creating climates of “falsehood and self-
deception” (Gordon, 1999, pp. 26-28). We can encourage reasonable, not unconditional, 
obedience. Drawing from Hamachek (1976), there are many interrelated strategies, including 
teachers providing opportunities for students to: disagree with any intimidation or penalty, see 
authority figures as capable of mistakes, discuss reasons for rules and regulations, and explore 
examples of when it is acceptable or even desirable to be disobedient. 
Expanding Fetishized Perception 
A certain amount of personal and collective growth needs to happen in order to counter humans’ 
propensity for fetishizing evil. To borrow from den Heyer (2017), it is not about motivating 
students (or ourselves), it is about animating “intention and willfulness” (p. 4). In the context of 
this article, I call for us to attend to our defensive compensatory actions to find helpful rather 
than harmful ways to reduce worldview threats: “the best defense would be one that reduces 
the threat without escalating conflict and that allows for positive relations among people of 
different worldviews” (Hayes, Schimel, & Williams, 2008, p. 506). 
Such a task involves relatively easy components such as attending to how we talk about others 
(e.g., avoiding labelling other individuals and groups as evil), as well as more complex tasks such 
as seeking helpful rather than harmful immortality projects. For this latter task, however, there 
are no easy, universal solutions; thus, further research and thought is needed. 
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Thinking about genocide in and out of the classroom is a complicated task. The framing of 
Arendt’s concept of banal evil is helpful because it explains the behavior of many ordinary people, 
but it is incomplete without the addition of Becker’s concept of the fetishization of evil because 
banality does not account for those who come to delight in their harmful work. Categorizing 
otherwise normal people who contribute to atrocities through multiple lenses can at least 
somewhat help. There are some who perpetuate genocide in very banal ways, others who feel 
compelled to be obedient and deflect responsibility to the authority figure, and those who 
fetishize evil and participate in the killing with glee. For some, more than one of these dispositions 
might be operating in the same person, more or less, over time. The combination of Arendt 
(informed by the work of Minnich and Milgram) and Becker can help us comprehend why 
genocides continue to occur. 
  
Journal of International Social Studies, v. 8, n. 2, 2018, pp. 160-171 
 
 
Corresponding author:  vankesse@ualberta.ca  
©2012/2018 National Council for Social Studies International Assembly 





Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. 
New York, NY: Harper & Row. 
al-Balaghah, N. (1969). America plots against Iran. Emam.com. Retrieved from http://emam.com/ 
posts/view /15718/Speech 
Arendt, H. (1977). The life of the mind: Thinking (vol. 1). New York, NY: Harcourt Brace. 
Arendt, H. (2006). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil. New York, NY: Penguin. (Original 
work published in 1963) 
Becker, E. (1975). Escape from evil. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Blass, T. (1991). Understanding behavior in the Milgram obedience experiment: The role of personality, 
situations, and their interactions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 398–413. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.60.3.398 
Borofsky, G. L., & Brand, D. J. (1980). Personality organization and psychological functioning of the 
Nuremberg War Criminals: The Rorschach data. In J. Dimsdale (Ed.), Survivors, victims and 
perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust (pp. 359–403). New York, NY: Hemisphere. 
Browning, C. R. (1993). Ordinary men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. New 
York, NY: Harper Perennial. 
Bush, G. W. (2002, January 29). State of the union address. Presidential speeches archive. Charlottesville, 
VA: Miller Center. Retrieved from http://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-
speeches/january-29-2002-state-union-address 
den Heyer, K. (2017). A thinking education. Critical Education, 8(12), 1–8. Retrieved from 
http://ices.library.ubc.ca/index.php/criticaled/article/viewFile/186203/185420 
den Heyer, K., & van Kessel, C. (2015). Evil, agency, and citizenship education. McGill Journal of Education, 
50(1), 1–18. Retrieved from http://mje.mcgill.ca/article/viewFile/9166/7035 
Garrett, H. J. (2017). Learning to be in the world with others: Difficult knowledge and social studies 
education. New York, NY: Peter Lang. 
Gordon, M. (1999). Arendt and Conrad on the banality of evil: Some implications for education. Journal of 
Thought, 34(2), 15–30. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/42589573 
Hamachek, D. E. (1976). Removing the stigma from obedience behavior. Phi Delta Kappan, 57, 443–446. 
Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/20298318 
Journal of International Social Studies, v. 8, n. 2, 2018, pp. 160-171 
 
 
Corresponding author:  vankesse@ualberta.ca  
©2012/2018 National Council for Social Studies International Assembly 




Hatzfeld, J. (2006). Machete season: The killers in Rwanda speak (L. Coverdale, Trans.). New York, NY: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (Original work published in 2003) 
Hayes, J., Schimel, J., & Williams, T. J. (2008). Fighting death with death: The buffering effects of learning 
that worldview violators have died. Psychological Science, 19, 501–507. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2008.02115.x 
Lang, B. (1990). Act and idea in the Nazi genocide. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Lange, L. (2012). Understanding and action: Thinking with Arendt about democratic education. 
Perspectives in Education, 30(4), 1–8. 
Marks, M. J. (2017). Teaching the Holocaust as cautionary tale. The Social Studies, 108, 129–135. 
doi:10.1080/00377996.2017.1343790 
Matt. (2013, December 23). The Milgram experiment (full film) [Video file]. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wdUu3u9Web4 
Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67, 371–
378. 
Milgram, S. (1965). Liberating effects of group pressure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1, 
127–134.  
Minnich, E. (2014). The evil of banality: Arendt revisited. Arts & Humanities in Higher Education, 13, 158–
179. doi:10.1177/1474022213513543 
Pitt, A., & Britzman, D. (2003). Speculations on qualities of difficult knowledge in teaching and learning: 
An experiment in psychoanalytic research. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in 
Education, 16(6), 755–776. doi: 10.1080/09518390310001632135 
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Maxfield, M. (2006). On the unique psychological import of 
the human awareness of mortality: Theme and variations. Psychological Inquiry, 17, 328–356. 
Saltzman, A. L. (2000). The role of obedience experiments in Holocaust studies: The case for renewed 
visibility. In T. Blass (Ed.), Obedience to authority: Current perspectives on the Milgram paradigm 
(pp. 125–144). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Schimel, J., Hayes, J., Williams, T., & Jahrig, J. (2007). Is death really the worm at the core? Converging 
evidence that worldview threat increases death-thought accessibility. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 92, 789–803. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.789 
Semmerling, T. J. (2008). Those “evil” Muslims! Orientalist fears in the narratives of the War on Terror. 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 28, 207–233. doi:10.1080/13602000802303144 
Journal of International Social Studies, v. 8, n. 2, 2018, pp. 160-171 
 
 
Corresponding author:  vankesse@ualberta.ca  
©2012/2018 National Council for Social Studies International Assembly 




Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2015). The worm at the core: On the role of death in life. 
New York, NY: Random House. 
Spector, H. (2017). Cultivating the ethical imagination in education: Perspectives from three public 
intellectuals. Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 39, 39–59. 
doi:10.1080/10714413.2017.1262157 
Stangneth, B. (2015). Eichmann before Jerusalem: The unexamined life of a mass murderer. New York, NY: 
Penguin Random House. 
Trump, D. J. [realDonaldTrump]. (2017, February 3). We must keep “evil” out of our country! [tweet]. 
Retrieved from https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/827655062835052544 
Utica City School District. (1976). Nature of good and evil. Washington, DC: Office of Education. 
van Kessel, C. (2017). A phenomenographic study of youth conceptualizations of evil: Order-words and 
the politics of evil. Canadian Journal of Education, 40, 576–602. Retrieve from 
http://journals.sfu.ca/cje/index.php/cje-rce/article/view/3105/2464 
van Kessel, C., & Crowley, R. M. (2017). Villainification and evil in social studies education. Theory & 
Research in Social Education, 95(4), 427–455. doi:10.1080/00933104.2017.1285734 
Williams, T. J., Schimel, J., Hayes, J., & Faucher, E. H. (2012). The effects of existential threat on reading 
comprehension of worldview affirming and disconfirming information. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 42, 602–616. doi:10.1002/ejsp.1849 
Zilmer, E. A., Harrower, M., Ritzler, B. A., & Archer, R. P. (1995). The LEA series in personality and clinical 
psychology. The quest for the Nazi personality: A psychological investigation of Nazi war 
criminals. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Acknowledgement:   
This work was supported by the Social Science & Humanities Research Council of Canada [grant number 
430-2018-00257, 2018] 
 
About the Author: 
Cathryn van Kessel is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Secondary Education at the University 
of Alberta 
 
